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Theme: Since the 1990s the EU has increasingly succeeded in developing a role in the 
internal security domain. However, this is constrained by the limitations imposed by the 
Member states in this regard. 
 
 
Summary: The provision of internal security is a core function of the state; hence, this 
domain remains a difficult one for EU policy-making. Since the 1990s the EU has 
increasingly succeeded in developing its role, having now a formal mandate and a record 
of progress in four main fields: information sharing, convergence of national internal 
security systems, facilitation of cross-border cooperation and common international 
action. Yet the Union’s role is constrained by the limitations the Member States have 
imposed on its action possibilities, a prevailing cooperative rather than integrative 
rationale and serious implementation deficits. The Treaty of Lisbon offers some additional 
potential for developing the EU’s role, but also protects the Member States’ national 
competences in the field, so that much will depend on the actual content of the new 2010-
14 Stockholm Programme for the Area of freedom, security and justice. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
(1) A Difficult Field for European Integration 
The provision of internal security is one of the State’s core functions and is consequently 
highly protected by the principles of national sovereignty and territoriality. Unlike the 
domain of external security –where international cooperation in the form of alliances and 
collective security systems has a long tradition and is one of the key instruments to 
enhance security–, no similar ‘culture’ of cooperation exists in the internal security field. 
Different national approaches and perceptions of internal security issues (such as the 
UK’s insistence on maintaining border controls with other EU countries) add to the EU’s 
political difficulties in this domain, as does the fact that ‘law and order’ issues can make 
national governments win and lose elections and hence they remain very keen to retain 
national control. 
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(2) The Origins of the EU’s Role in the Internal Security Domain 
The EU’s current role in the internal security domain can be traced back to: (a) the 
establishment of the TREVI cooperation in the 1970s in response to the terrorist 
challenges at the time; (b) the need of the Schengen members from 1985 onwards to 
agree on a broad range of compensatory measures to offset internal security risks 
resulting from the abolition of internal border controls; (c) the need for the EC/EU 
members from the end of the 1980s onwards to offset internal security risks resulting from 
the cross-border liberalisation of economic transactions in the context of the Internal 
Market and the introduction of the Euro; and (d) the enhanced and new internal-security 
risk resulting from the higher permeability of borders and the growth of organised crime 
structures in the wider Europe from the beginning of the 1990s. The post-9/11 increased 
terrorist threat perception, rather than being at the origin of the EU’s role in the internal 
security domain, has only acted as an accelerator –albeit a major one– of an already 
growing role of the EU in this domain. 
 
(3) The EU’s Internal Security Mandate 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU has –as part of the general 
Treaty objective of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ)– an explicit mandate 
to provide EU citizens with a ‘high level of security’ (Articles 29 TEU and 61(e) TEC), 
primarily through police and judicial cooperation measures. The EU’s internal security 
mandate is, however, different from that of the states themselves as the EU’s role is 
limited to that of a provider of ‘added value’ with respect to internal security functions that 
Member States already fulfil at the national level, with the security competences of the 
Member States remaining predominant and being explicitly protected in the Treaties. The 
principle of subsidiarity is very much at the core of the AFSJ security concept as action at 
the EU level can only be justified if internal security issues –because of their cross-border 
nature– can potentially be more effectively handled through common action at the EU 
level. In practice this has meant that forms of crime without a cross-border dimension –
such as youth crime and burglaries– have so far remained almost totally outside the EU’s 
scope of action, that has primarily focused on serious forms of cross-border crime such as 
terrorism, transnational organised crime, drug-trafficking and –in an example of the 
‘securitisation’ of other justice and home affairs fields– illegal immigration. Although to 
some extent original and innovative because of its extension of the notion of ‘internal 
security’ to an ‘area’ encompassing the territories of 27 Member States, the EU’s security 
mandate is therefore limited in its substantive reach. The gradual extension of this 
substantive reach remains dependent on the political consensus among the Member 
States, and it will remain so even under the Lisbon Treaty (see below), that explicitly 
protects the Member States’ national internal security functions. 
 
(4) The Progress of the EU’s Role in Internal Security 
Despite these difficulties and the limitations to its mandate, the Union has been able to 
develop its role in the internal security domain quite significantly since the 1990s. Four 
distinct areas of progress can be identified: 
 
(a) Information sharing and common threat assessment. Whereas in the 1990s 
information sharing on internal security issues was still sporadic and essentially 
voluntary, the strengthening of Europol, the implementation of the principle of 
availability (mainly through the June 2008 ‘Prüm’ Framework Decision on the 
stepping-up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime), the strengthening of judicial assistance mechanisms (such as 
the 2005 Framework Decision on the exchange of criminal record data) and the 
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use of intelligence-service information (mainly for counter-terrorism purposes) has 
brought about a major quantitative and qualitative change. The development of 
information-sharing mechanisms and the strengthening of their institutional context 
has in turn allowed progress towards common cross-border internal security risk 
assessments (such as in the form of the Europol OCTA and TESAT reports, 
Frontex border risks reports) which have an increasing influence on programming 
and prioritisation at the EU level. 
 
(b) Convergence of national internal security systems. Despite its minimal level (see 
below), legislative harmonisation has in some fields (such as the fight against 
terrorism, organised crime, trafficking in human beings and corruption) forced 
‘laggard’ Member States to bring their national criminal law codes into line with 
mainstream European principles and concepts. Although less visible (and 
measurable) than legislation changes, the proliferation of ‘soft governance’ best 
practice identification and (through training) transfer, as well as recommendations 
and guidelines, is having a slow but steady impact on spreading common 
standards and thereby reducing friction in cross-border cooperation. In the context 
of the accession process the new Member States have been forced to adapt their 
systems to AFSJ requirements (such as through the creation of centralised police 
units for fighting organised crime, the demilitarisation and professionalisation of 
border guards and the upgrading of legislation and action capabilities in the fight 
against corruption and money-laundering). 
 
(c) Facilitation of cross-border cooperation. Europol, Eurojust and Frontex are playing 
an increasingly important role in facilitating the interaction between the respective 
national law enforcement and judicial authorities. Both legislation (eg, on Joint 
Investigation Teams/JITs and Rapid Border Intervention Teams/RABITs) and 
funding instruments (programmes under the 2007-2013 financial perspective, 
External Border Fund) are used on a large scale to reduce obstacles to cross-
border operational cooperation through non-legislative measures such as training, 
best practice identification and operational and technical support. Mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions (eg, on the basis the Framework Decisions of 13 
June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant, of 22 July 2003 on the execution of 
orders freezing property or evidence and of 24 February 2005 on the confiscation 
of crime-related proceeds) has opened up significant quasi-automatic pathways for 
the implementation of decisions of the requesting national system by the 
authorities of the requested national system, extending de facto the ‘reach’ of 
national internal security measures to the territories of other EU Member States. 
The approximation of national law has also helped –although on a more modest 
scale– to create a common minimum legal platform for cross-border cooperation in 
fields with major challenges such as terrorism (Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002) and trafficking in human beings (Framework Decision of 19 July 2002). 
 
(d) Common international action. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam there has been a significant expansion of external EU action to reduce 
internal security risks within the AFSJ. Four main dimensions of this expansion 
can be identified: (1) the increased ‘mainstreaming’ of internal security objectives 
(especially as regards the fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal 
immigration) in overall EU external relations, including CFSP and external 
economic relations; (2) enhanced operational cooperation with some third 
countries (especially with the US, with whom two agreements on police 
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cooperation via Europol and two on mutual legal assistance have been signed); 
(3) the expansion of internal security capacity building assistance to third countries 
with the aim of strengthening their police, judicial and border control systems, 
often with a focus on primary EU concerns (especially in the Western Balkans and 
the ENP countries); and (4) common positions and action in international 
organisations (eg, cooperation with the UN Counter-terrorism Directorate and UN 
Convention against Corruption). 
 
(5) The Limits of the EU’s Role in Internal Security 
At the AFSJ’s current stage of development, three main limitations to the EU’s role in 
internal security can be observed: 
 
(a) Limitations of EU action possibilities. The Member States have so far not transferred 
any operational law enforcement and judicial powers to the Union, and the much 
developed agencies Europol, Eurojust and Frontex are still largely limited to 
information exchange, analysis and coordination functions. As a result, the EU cannot 
act directly on internal security risks but has to rely on Member State authorities to 
take appropriate action, which can entail friction and delays and also limit international 
action possibilities. Even the frameworks created for cross-border operational 
deployment of multi-national units (such as JITs and RABITs) have still to operate 
under a range of limitations imposed by the principle of territoriality. The unanimity 
requirement under Title VI TEU (‘third pillar’) has kept legislative harmonisation at a 
minimal(ist) level, exemplified, inter alia, by the extensive use of ‘minimum maximum 
penalties’ as regards the approximation of criminal sanctions. Even some of the 
mutual recognition measures have been deprived of much of their substance as a 
result of satisfying each national delegation, for which the December 2008 Framework 
Decision on the European Evidence Warrant with its restriction to already available 
evidence in the form of documents, objects and data (not covering, for instance, DNA 
samples or the monitoring of bank accounts) is a primary example. 
 
(b) Cooperation rather than integration as the prevailing rationale. For the reasons 
referred to above, Member States have tried to avoid any real legal and structural 
‘integration’ in the internal security field, focusing instead on the facilitation of cross-
border cooperation between law enforcement and judicial authorities. While this has 
brought about qualitative progress in addressing transnational internal security risks, it 
has also led EU action on internal security issues to remain based on 27 cooperating 
national systems that are largely autonomous and substantially different in terms of 
structures, procedures and legal frameworks. This not only contributes to major 
persisting operational friction because of both the absence of effective common 
command-and-control structures and continuing incompatibilities between the national 
structures, procedures and rules supposed to interact in the fight against cross-border 
crime –which inevitably reduces effectiveness–, but also to a permanent need for a 
huge coordination effort –that takes up much of the time and resources of the Council 
bodies and the special agencies–. 
 
(c) Significant implementation deficits. The EU’s action in the internal security domain is 
affected by a double implementation deficit, both at the EU and the national levels. At 
the EU level, the Heads of State and Government (in the European Council) and often 
also the Ministers of the Interior and of Justice (in the JHA Council) find it easier to 
agree on ambitious objectives and strategies rather than on ensuring their subsequent 
implementation through appropriate legislative acts, which are often greatly delayed 
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and ‘thinned-out’ in the detailed negotiations at the expert level. This, however, is part 
of a structural problem of the EU as a whole, as the political cost of not achieving 
declared objectives is much lower in the EU context than in a national 
government/parliament/media context. The prevailing unanimity requirement, the 
extensive use of parliamentary reserves and the complexities of ‘pillar division’ also 
contribute to the implementation deficit at the EU level, which according to the 
European Commission’s July 2008 report on the implementation of the current ‘Hague 
Programme’ has led to an achievement rate of agreed upon objectives of only 38% 
(COM(2008)373). At the national level, Member States –to some extent helped by the 
absence of a treaty infringement procedure under Title VI TEU– often take a very long 
time to transpose major internal-security-related legislation, and sometimes –as in the 
case of the European Arrest Warrant– also try to ‘soften’ the impact of these 
measures through specific national application rules partly at variance with the rules 
defined at the EU level. 
 
(6) The Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides some potential for the strengthening of the EU’s role in the 
internal security domain, mainly through the de facto ‘communitarisation’ of the current 
‘third pillar’, the formal abolition of the ‘pillar divide’, the extension of the qualified majority 
to a range of internal security matters, reinforced EU competences in the fields of criminal 
and criminal procedural law, the possibility of establishing a European Public Prosecutor 
and the provision for a legislative text defining the conditions under which police officers 
can operate in the territory of another Member State. Yet at the same time, the new 
Treaty also protects the national internal security and law and order competences of the 
Member States more explicitly than before (amended Article 4(2) TEU and Article 72 
TFEU), extends the existing ‘opt-outs’ for the UK, Ireland and Denmark to police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, introduces an ‘emergency brake’ to protect 
national criminal justice systems against measures subject to majority voting which a 
Member State might find undesirable and still provides for a number of unanimity 
requirements on matters of particular sensitivity (such as the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, operational cooperation between police forces and 
the conditions and limitations under which police authorities may operate in the territory of 
another Member State). The new Treaty is therefore unlikely in itself to provide a major 
new breakthrough for the EU’s role in the internal security domain. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Stockholm Programme and the Future of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
At least as important, if not more, as the Lisbon Treaty for the further development of the 
Union’s role is the Stockholm Programme, to be adopted under the Swedish Presidency 
of the second half of 2009, as it will define priorities and objectives for the years 2010 to 
2014. A substantial Stockholm Programme coinciding with the –still uncertain– entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon could provide a basis for a new phase of dynamic growth of 
the Union’s role in the internal security domain, but the lack of consensus on certain 
issues (such as the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor) could increase the 
chance/risk of some of this potential being realised only on the basis of an ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ involving only some of the Member States. 
 
In its proposals for the Stockholm Programme adopted on 10 June 2009 
(COM(2009)262/4) the European Commission has only been moderately ambitious in the 
internal security field, carefully avoiding –while the second Irish referendum is still 
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pending– any of the potential new action possibilities provided by the Lisbon Treaty. While 
the Commission Communication contains many proposals which could improve the 
functioning of existing structures and mechanisms –such as the creation of an ‘Erasmus’-
type exchange programme for internal security professionals to build-up cross-border trust 
and expertise and the introduction of a European Information Model for the sharing of 
security related information–, the proposals could have been more substantial –at the 
price of also being more controversial– as regards new initiatives to strengthen cross-
border operational police cooperation and the legislative agenda in the field of criminal 
law. The Commission is certainly also right in advocating the definition of a more long-
term ‘Internal Security Strategy’ clarifying responsibilities and priorities –EU measures 
have so far followed a somewhat piecemeal approach often in response to events or 
forceful priorities of some Member States– but the Stockholm Programme should be a bit 
more concrete on the actual content of such a Strategy, including on its external relations 
and financial solidarity aspects. 
 
Finally, it should also be noted that the June 2009 Commission proposals –partly in 
response to the increasing criticism about the predominance of security objectives within 
the AFSJ– place the main emphasis for the future development of the AFSJ on the 
promotion and protection of citizen’s rights. While an effective balance between security 
and the rights of the individual is necessary for both the credibility and the legitimacy of 
the AFSJ as a fundamental political project, the risks posed to fundamental rights by EU 
measures in this field often tend to be slightly exaggerated as the primary risks in this 
respect are still to be found at the national level, as all executive powers in the internal 
security field remain with the Member States which are also at the origin of most of the 
data processed at EU level for internal security purposes. Some of the energy of the 
critics of the EU’s role in the internal security domain might actually be focused more 
effectively on the serious problems at the national level, as shown by the recent issues in 
several Member States regarding detention without trial, extraordinary renditions and 
improper use of personal data. Any downgrading of the EU’s internal security dimension 
in response to partly exaggerated fears about the ‘securitisation’ effects of the AFSJ could 
substantially reduce the real added value that the EU can provide to Member States that 
are increasingly struggling to find effective responses to the growing diversity and 
sophistication of serious cross-border crime. The Stockholm Programme should make 
internal security and the rights of the individual equal parts of the same fundamental 
objective of developing the AFSJ rather than downgrading one in favour of the other –all 
the more so as a good case can be made for internal security also being a right to which 
the European citizen is entitled to–. 
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